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STACKING THE DECK? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF 
AGREEMENT RATES BETWEEN PRO TEMPORE JUSTICES 
AND CHIEF JUSTICES OF CALIFORNIA, 1977-2003* 
JAMES C. BRENT 
The chief justice of California is empowered to select a pro tempore justice when one or more 
of the court’s regular justices are absent.  Chief Justice Rose Bird was accused of using this 
power to manipulate case outcomes. Contemporary scholarly investigations came to mixed 
conclusions. Bird’s successors have adopted the nondiscretionary method of alphabetical 
selection. The present study compares the agreement rates of temporary justices with Bird 
and with her two immediate successors, Malcolm Lucas and Ronald George.  It finds evi­
dence of vote bias for Bird, particularly in close cases and cases before April 1981. It does 
not find evidence of vote bias for Chief Justices Lucas or George, suggesting that a non­
discretionary selection procedure should be formally required. 
All collegial courts inevitably experience temporary vacancies created by the absence of one or more of the courts’ permanent members. Vacancies may be 
short, if caused by a conflict of interest in a particular case, or long, if caused by a jus­
tice’s departure from the court.  One way to deal with vacancies is to simply proceed 
without a full complement of justices, often risking the possibility of a tie vote. The 
United States Supreme Court does not use temporary justices, an approach emulated 
by thirteen American states. However, courts of last resort in thirty-seven states pro­
vide for the temporary appointment of lower-court judges in at least some of the cases 
that they decide (Brent, 2004).  
State temporary lower-court judges are selected through a wide variety of meth­
ods.  On one end of the spectrum are the states—a majority—that strive to keep the 
selection process apolitical and mechanical, usually by delegating the task to the clerk 
of the court, who selects appointees by a neutral procedure, for example, alphabeti­
cally.  One of the most unusual—and most neutral—is Washington’s practice of draw­
ing names from a glass jar.  On the other end of the spectrum are those systems that 
promote discretion, usually by giving either the chief justice or, less frequently, the 
governor, the power to make such appointments.  Such systems seem to invite politi­
cal considerations to enter and perhaps dominate the process. 
One state with a discretionary system of selecting pro tempore justices is 
California. The California Supreme Court consists of seven justices. The California 
Constitution requires the concurrence of four justices to render a decision. Thus, 
when one or more of the regular justices is absent for any reason, a temporary justice 
* The author would like to thank Suzanne Tringali for her diligent research assistance, as well as Terry 
Christensen, Robert Dudley, Stephen L. Wasby, and the anonymous reviewers for their input on earlier drafts of 
this paper. 
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is appointed (Art. VI, Sec. 2). The constitution also says, “The Chief Justice may 
provide for the assignment of any judge to another court but only with the judge’s 
consent if the court is of lower jurisdiction” (Art. VI, Sec. 6). With this small excep­
tion, the chief justice’s power to select is unlimited, and the chief justice is not 
required to follow any particular procedure or consult with anybody regarding the 
choice of a temporary justice. 
The political context of the California Supreme Court makes it reasonable to 
believe that a chief could be tempted to use this power to achieve policy goals. The 
California Supreme Court has a largely discretionary docket.  Many of the cases that 
it decides present the justices with sharp ideological and policy choices. Partially as 
a consequence, the court is prominent and visible and has experienced relatively high 
levels of conflict (Dolan, 2002; Egelko, 1998), which manifests itself in high levels of 
dissent. This last fact may particularly tempt the chief justice to stack the court with 
allies in cases in which they could affect the outcome. 
Chief Justice Rose Bird was criticized for doing exactly that (Stolz, 1981). 
When Bird passed away in 1999, popular commentary (e.g., Fried, 1999; Meyerson, 
1999) emphasized her opposition to the death penalty, which led the voters to turn 
her and two colleagues out of office in the retention election of November 1986. In 
the public mind, the association between Bird and the death penalty is so strongly 
established that it is often forgotten that Bird took other actions that generated con­
troversy and political opposition. One such controversy involved her temporary judi­
cial appointments. Conservatives were particularly critical of Assembly v. Deukmejian 
(1980), in which the court upheld a Democratic legislative redistricting plan by a 4­
3 vote, with a pro tempore justice joining Bird in the majority. 
Before Bird became chief justice, the normal practice was to select pro tempore 
justices from the California Courts of Appeal. Bird initiated the practice of also 
appointing trial-court judges—from both the municipal and superior court—to the 
high court, justifying this decision as “an effort to unify the court system and have 
judges understand what happens at other levels of the judiciary” (Salzman, quoted in 
Stolz, 1981). One criticism of this practice was that it led to unqualified trial judges 
deciding cases of great significance (Medsger, 1983:59). 
At the time, the charges of manipulation were sufficiently well publicized that 
at least three scholarly analyses were conducted (Comment, 1980; Wildman and 
Whitehead, 1985; Barnett and Rubinfeld, 1986). As we will see, those studies pro­
duced mixed results. Nevertheless, the charges merely reinforced the popular suspi­
cion that Bird was too concerned with pursuing an ideological agenda. Partially as a 
consequence, her successors took steps to alter the procedure for selecting pro tem­
pore justices to make the selection less discretionary. 
TEMPORARY JUDGES AND JUDICIAL LEGITIMACY 
No scholarly inquiry of the voting behavior of California’s pro tempore justices has 
been conducted since the changes in the selection process were implemented. The 
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present study aims to assess the effect of these changes by comparing the agreement 
rates between California pro tempore justices and Chief Justices Rose Bird, Malcolm 
Lucas, and Ronald M. George from 1977 to 2003. If Chief Justice Bird was indeed 
manipulating the system, the decision to select judges alphabetically should have 
resulted in lower levels of agreement between pro tempore justices and Bird’s succes­
sors. This study will attempt to determine whether this occurred. Such an empirical 
study, in addition to casting additional light on the behavior of Bird and her succes­
sors, may also illuminate the larger issues of whether temporary justices should be used 
at all and, if so, how they should be selected. 
Because temporary judges participate in dozens of cases around the country each 
year, their use has the potential to undermine public confidence in the courts.  Much 
of the judiciary’s power stems from the public’s perception of its legitimacy (Fein and 
Neuborne, 1998; Levinson, 1980), but this sense of legitimacy can be undermined if 
judges are perceived to be motivated by political rather than legal concerns. Some 
observers have also expressed concern that appointing lower-court judges to sit on 
higher courts may affect the quality of deliberations because the temporary insertion 
of a judge onto a collegial court may disrupt established patterns of interaction. 
Lower-court judges may not be as qualified as their high-court counterparts, and they 
may come with different backgrounds than those with whom they are now sitting 
(Slotnick, 1983). 
Selection of judges, including temporary judges, also affects judicial independ­
ence, a crucial element of judicial legitimacy.  The United States Supreme Court has 
noted several different conceptions of judicial independence. It may be defined as 
consisting of “the lack of bias for or against either party to the proceeding,” or as a 
“lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal view” (Republican Party 
of Minnesota v. White 775, 777, emphasis in original). The Court viewed the first of 
these conceptions of judicial independence as “its root meaning” (at 775), more 
important than the second. The selection of a temporary judge for a single case thus 
threatens the “root meaning” of judicial independence, particularly if the selection 
involves discretion. 
Because courts make critical decisions affecting public policy, competing inter­
ests will attempt to influence the composition of the judiciary.  Executives will often 
appoint judges whose ideologies are consistent with their own, and interest groups 
will donate money to like-minded candidates for judgeships, prompting the fear that 
successful judicial candidates may feel beholden to their political benefactors and 
vote in ways designed to please them. 
In the selection of permanent judges or justices, these attempts at influencing 
the judiciary are often blunt at best because over the course of their careers, appellate 
judges rule in numerous cases upon a wide range of issues. Thus, even if jurists have 
been selected with an eye toward their general judicial philosophy, behavior in spe­
cific cases can rarely be predicted with certainty.  Because a temporary justice is often 
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selected for a single, specific case, the appointment of temporary judges would seem 
to be particularly open to manipulation. 
Any selection procedure that involves discretion may raise suspicions that case 
outcomes are being directly manipulated. This problem would appear to be particu­
larly acute in Alabama, New York, and Texas, where temporary judges are appointed 
only when the court expects that it will be tied, and a temporary justice is appointed 
to cast the deciding vote. In Alabama and Texas, the governor is empowered to 
appoint this tiebreaker; in California, it is the chief justice. 
PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF CALIFORNIA’S TEMPORARY 
JUSTICES 
At least three major scholarly studies were conducted at the time Chief Justice Bird’s 
actions were criticized.  The first spanned 1954 to 1979 and compared the behavior of 
temporary justices appointed by Chief Justices Gibson, Traynor, Wright, and Bird. 
Agreement rates between temporary justices and the appointing chief justice were 
high for each of the four, ranging from a low of 79 percent (Traynor) to a high of 97 
percent (Gibson) (Comment, 1980:437).  A high percentage of cases were decided by 
unanimous or near-unanimous votes, but separate analysis of agreement rates in close 
cases showed that, to a statistically significant degree, temporary justices were more 
likely than regular justices to vote in agreement with Chief Justices Gibson, Wright, 
and Bird.  This led the authors to suggest as a plausible conclusion that “some chief 
justices may have used the appointment power to assure another vote for their own 
position” (Comment, 1980:439), but they made no specific allegations of impropriety. 
Another brief study five years later took a different approach and extended the 
analysis through April 1985, focusing solely on the Bird court.  Temporary justices’ 
agreement rates with Chief Justice Bird were compared with their agreement with act­
ing chief justices who made such appointments in Bird’s absence.  Finding no signifi­
cant difference in agreement rates, the authors concluded that the charge of manipu­
lation by Bird “lacks any evidentiary support” (Wildman and Whitehead, 1985:7). 
A much more expansive study appeared the following year (Barnett and 
Rubinfeld, 1986). There, the behavior of pro tempore justices between 1954 and 
1984, during the tenures of Chief Justices Gibson, Traynor, Wright, and Bird, was 
examined. In addition to analyzing agreement rates, the authors also attempted to 
discern whether the pattern of Bird’s assignments revealed an attempt to manipulate. 
This study showed that temporary justices were somewhat more likely to vote with 
the chief than were other justices and provided evidence of bias in Chief Justice Bird’s 
assignments before she instituted a procedural change in April 1981.  After that date, 
temporary justices overall were not more likely to support her than temporary justices 
had earlier supported other chief justices (1986:1141), but temporary justices re­
appointed to second and subsequent cases did indeed support her at higher rates than 
their one-shot colleagues did (1986:1144). 
18 
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Rose Bird’s successors, Malcolm Lucas and Ronald George, have made two sig­
nificant changes to the procedures and criteria for selecting temporary judges. First 
and perhaps most important, they adopted the practice of selecting temporary judges 
more-or-less alphabetically, a task handled by the clerk of the court.  Judges are asked 
to participate in alphabetical order but are not always able to serve when it is their 
turn, perhaps because of prior commitments or involvement in the case being 
appealed. Chief Justice George specifically explained this change as an attempt to 
avoid even the appearance of impropriety (George, 2004). Second, Chief Justice 
Lucas ended the practice of appointing trial court judges and restricted his appoint­
ments to the courts of appeals presiding judges with one or more years of experience. 
Under Chief Justice George, all appellate judges were eligible to serve. 
Another change has occurred informally.  Chief justices have the discretion to 
assign retired justices of the court itself, and this practice was relatively common in the 
past (Barnett and Rubinfeld, 1986), but it has since ended. Under Chief Justice Lucas, 
retired justices were assigned only to fill the vacancy created by their own retirements, 
assignments that often lasted several months. Chief Justice George abandoned this 
practice entirely, and no retired justices have been assigned since July 1996.  
Prior studies of California’s pro tempore justices have included retired justices 
in the analysis. The present study focuses instead only on temporary appointees from 
the lower courts, for several reasons. As noted previously, in July 1996 Chief Justice 
George stopped assigning retired justices as pro tempore justices.  “Retired” justices 
were assigned by Malcolm Lucas only to fill the vacancies created by their own retire­
ments. The decision to ask (or allow) a justice to remain on the bench until his suc­
cessor is seated, rather than to appoint a series of lower-court judges to fill the vacan­
cy, theoretically involves discretion on the part of the chief justice.  It would not, 
however, appear to be the same sort of discretion involved in selecting lower-court 
judges. For one thing, retired justices do not hear only a single case, but instead hear 
several cases over a period of months.  This makes it difficult to argue that they were 
assigned to manipulate the outcome of a particular case.  Instead, assigning a retired 
justice was not so much an act of policymaking as an act of courtesy and collegiality. 
Moreover, it also reduced the administrative burden on the chief justice and the lower 
courts and saved money for California taxpayers. Furthermore, very few of the incen­
tives that the chief justice could normally provide to a lower-court judge would moti­
vate a retired judge to vote to curry the chief ’s favor.  A retired justice is not interest­
ed in appointment to a higher court, and likely does not wish to serve on boards or 
commissions. 
TEMPORARY JUSTICES AND THE CHIEF: NATURAL ALLIES? 
Apart from the fact that both chief justices and temporary justices tend to dissent at 
lower-than-average rates, making their agreement rates rise as a result, pro tempore 
justices might be likely to vote with the chief for several reasons apart from political 
manipulation by the chief. For example, “selection preference” may result in the 
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chief justice appointing temporary justices not based on an anticipated vote in the 
case, but because the chief justice is familiar with them and appoints them either for 
patronage reasons, to groom potential members of the court, or to build a corps of 
allies on the lower courts. Such appointees might be particularly likely to agree with 
the chief (Barnett and Rubinfeld, 1986:1057). The shift to an alphabetical selection 
process would seem to eliminate such possibilities. Still another reason, noted by 
Barnett and Rubinfeld (1986:1058), is that the temporary justices may vote with the 
chief justice to fulfill their own “desire for reappointment as a temporary justice” 
(1986:1058), which the chief justice could satisfy.  This is related to Barnett and 
Rubinfeld’s suggestion (1986:1059) that temporary justices may vote with the chief 
“simply out of gratitude for being appointed to sit with the court.” The chief justice 
also has the power to assign lower-court judges to other courts, the Judicial Council, 
or numerous other commissions and boards—positions that some lower-court judges 
may covet. 
Alphabetical selection eliminates most of these posited reasons for agreement 
between temporary justices and the chief, but it does not eliminate them all. For 
example, ambition theory (Schlesinger, 1966; Herrick and Moore, 1993) suggests that 
when political actors seek higher office (“progressive ambition”), they may tailor 
their behavior to maximize their odds of advancement.  As one of three members of 
the state’s Commission on Judicial Appointments, which must confirm all guberna­
torial appointments to the bench, the chief holds the potential to veto an ambitious 
lower-court judge’s elevation, possibly providing an incentive for that judge to vote 
with the chief. However, the chance of any individual judge receiving a nomination 
is fairly small, and it depends far more on pleasing the present governor, or some 
future, unknown governor, than on pleasing the chief justice, who may well have left 
the bench by the time such an opportunity for promotion occurs. Moreover, the chief 
constitutes only one of three votes on the commission, and the commission itself has 
rarely challenged the governor’s choice, having rejected only two nominations since 
its creation in 1934 (Gerston and Christenson, 2003).  This makes the likelihood 
that a temporary justice would vote with the chief as part of a campaign for higher 
office somewhat remote. 
COURT PROCEDURE AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S MANTLE OF LEADERSHIP 
Entirely apart from manipulation by the chief, there remain reasons to believe that 
temporary judges will frequently vote with the chief. If a bewildered temporary jus­
tice is seeking cues, the chief would appear to be an obvious source. As on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the chief justice of California is really merely a “first among equals,” 
not possessing a weighted vote or effective methods of sanctioning colleagues, and 
thus would have little formal leverage with which to pressure a temporary justice for 
a vote.  However, the organizational socialization literature suggests that the actions 
of a leader have an impact on the adaptation of a newcomer to an institution (Major 
et al., 1995). By the virtue of the position, the chief is likely to be perceived as the 
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most visible and authoritative member of the court, possessing certain symbolic 
attributes that certainly might cause a pro tempore justice to perceive him or her as 
the “leader” of the court. 
This mantle of leadership is reinforced by the procedure used to integrate tem­
porary judges into the court’s decision-making process.  Because the California 
Supreme Court is required to render decisions within ninety days of the case being 
formally submitted at the end of oral argument or have their pay withheld (Art. VI, 
Sec. 19), the procedure for drafting and negotiating opinions is different from that 
used by the U.S. Supreme Court. Currently, at least four of the seven justices must 
vote to grant review.  The chief justice then assigns to a justice who voted to grant 
review the task of drafting a “calendar memorandum,” essentially a first draft of what 
will often, but certainly not always, become the majority opinion.  The draft is then 
circulated to the remaining justices, and the case is scheduled for oral argument with 
the consent of a majority of the court (California Supreme Court, 2003:20-22). In 
most cases, it is only at this point that a pro tempore justice becomes involved in the 
case. A significant exception occurs when the court is divided 3-3 on whether or not 
to grant review.  In that situation, a temporary justice is selected to break the tie and 
then also participates in the disposition of the case on the merits (George, 2004). 
A copy of the calendar memorandum and the legal briefs filed by the parties are 
distributed to the temporary justice(s) hearing the case, and all justices are given fif­
teen days to prepare a preliminary response.  The response may take one of four 
forms—“concur,” “concur with reservations,” “doubtful,” and “dissent,” and justices 
may, at their option, add other comments.  Upon receiving the preliminary respons­
es, the original author has the option of distributing a “yellow memo” response 
(George, 2004). 
For the pro tempore judge, all of the preceding takes place at a physical dis­
tance. On the morning of oral argument, the pro tempore justices usually arrive in 
the city in which argument is to be held. Although the California Supreme Court is 
based in San Francisco, it regularly holds oral argument in San Francisco, Los 
Angeles, and Sacramento, and occasionally in other California cities.  Temporary jus­
tices are not selected by location and must often travel to hear oral argument. After 
they arrive, they have a brief meeting with the chief justice. They do not usually 
meet their other colleagues until everyone is donning judicial robes in the cloakroom 
immediately before oral argument, although they are often known to the high court’s 
justices because of interactions at other judicial and bar events. 
The temporary justices then participate in oral argument, as well as in the sub­
sequent conference. The justices typically hear three cases during their morning ses­
sion and then meet immediately afterwards to confer about the cases over lunch. 
They typically hear three more cases in the afternoon, immediately followed by 
another conference. The chief usually schedules discussion of the case involving the 
pro tempore justices first, and they usually leave town immediately thereafter.  They 
continue to participate in the drafting and shaping of the opinions, but once again at 
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Table 1
 
Support for Chief Justices by Lower-Court Pro Tempore Justices, 1977-2003
 
Rose Bird Malcolm Lucas Ronald George 
Votes with chief justice 211 (77.9%) 65 (84.4%) 51 (85.0%) 
Votes against chief justice 60 (22.1%) 12 (15.6%) 9 (15.0%) 
Total 271 77 60 
a distance.  Thus they spend only a few short hours in the physical presence of their 
colleagues (George, 2004). 
Whether intentional or not, this procedure emphasizes the primacy and mantle 
of leadership of the chief justice in the mind of the newcomer. The chief is the indi­
vidual who makes the appointment. The chief is the justice responsible for receiving 
and issuing draft memoranda. The chief is the only justice to meet with the tempo­
rary justice on a personal, individual basis, however briefly. During that time, the 
chief instructs the newcomer on procedural matters (George, 2004). 
DATA AND FINDINGS 
This study is based on all California Supreme Court cases decided with a published 
opinion between March 1977 and December 2003 in which one or more lower-court 
temporary justices participated. Cases were located through a LEXIS search.1 Data 
regarding the lower-court judges’ political party and prior experience were obtained 
through various editions of California Courts and Judges (Bogen, Thompson, and 
Smart). If the judge’s political party was not explicitly stated, the political party of 
the appointing governor was used as a surrogate. This imperfect measure (Brace, 
Langer, and Hall, 2000) may be especially problematic when applied to appointments 
to intermediate state courts, which have a more muted tradition of partisan conflict 
and dissent than federal courts (Pinello, 1999), but it is the best measure readily avail­
able for this large group of relatively obscure jurists. 
During the study period, lower-court judges sitting by assignment cast 408 votes. 
During Bird’s almost ten-year tenure, temporary justices cast 271 votes, an average of 
27 per year.  The use of lower-court temporary justices decreased dramatically follow­
ing Bird’s departure as a result of lower turnover on the court during those years. 
Although Chief Justice Lucas served for almost the same amount of time that Bird 
had, he made only 77 temporary appointments, an average of approximately eight per 
year.  That figure has remained steady under Chief Justice Ronald George. 
“Assign! by” was the sole search term utilized. This search term yields 957 hits from March 1977 to December 
2003. Cases that did not actually involve temporary justices were excluded. To ensure that this search captured the 
universe of cases, cases identified in the LEXIS search were cross-checked with the bound volumes of the California 
Reports for three randomly chosen years. In each year, the LEXIS search had located all appropriate cases.  
1 
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Table 2 
Support for Rose Bird by Temporary Justices, Before and After April 1, 1981 
Before April 1981 April 1981 and later 
Votes with Bird 47 (94.0%) 164 (74.2%)*** 
Votes against Bird 3 (6.0%) 57 (25.8%) 
Total 50 221 
*** p < .001 
Table 3
 
Temporary and Associate Justice Agreement Rates with the Chief Justice
 
Temp. Justices Associate Justices Advantage 
Bird (all) 77.9% 71.4% +6.5%* 
Bird (pre-4/81) 94.0% 78.2% +15.8%** 
Bird (4/81 & later) 74.2% 69.7% +4.5% 
Lucas 84.4% 80.9% +3.5% 
George 85.0% 84.7% -0.3% 
** p < .01 
*p < .05 
A look at the overall rates of agreement between lower-court pro tempore jus­
tices and Chief Justices Bird, Lucas, and George provides little support for the charge 
that Bird manipulated the selection procedure, as she received support from pro tem­
pore justices only 78 percent of the time, compared to an 85 percent support rate 
enjoyed by her successors, a difference not statistically significant (see Table 1).  
As noted above, Chief Justice Bird changed her selection procedure in April 
1981 by widening the selection pool, resulting in a larger number of judges receiving 
assignments. The support rates for Rose Bird among temporary justices before and 
after April 1, 1981, strongly suggest that the system in place before April 1981 did 
indeed work to the advantage of the chief justice (see Table 2).  Consistent with 
Barnett and Rubinfeld (1986), this finding does support the inference of improper 
influence by the chief during her first three years on the state’s high court.  After Bird 
changed her assignment procedures to a more neutral method, her advantage largely 
disappeared. 
Pro tempore justices vote with the chief justice at high rates, regardless of the 
chief ’s identity.  However, regular associate justices may do so as well.  Therefore, 
Barnett and Rubinfeld compared the rates at which temporary justices agreed with 
the chief justice with the rate at which the court’s regular justices supported the chief. 
Comparable data for the 1977-2003 period, with the unit of analysis being the votes 
of individual justices, again support the inference that Rose Bird may have manipu­
23 
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Table 4
 
Partisan Differences in Support for the Chief Justice
 
Justices of the Same Party Justices of Opposite Party 
Bird 80.9% (174 of 215) 62.7% (32 of 51)** 
Lucas 93.3% (42 of 45) 71.9% (23 of 32)** 
George 86.4% (38 of 44) 81.3% (13 of 16) 
** p < .01 
lated the opinion-assignment procedure before April 1981: She enjoyed a large and 
statistically significant advantage among temporary justices before that date, but not 
after it. Under alphabetical selection, neither of her successors enjoyed a voting 
advantage among temporary justices (see Table 3).  
Despite significant evidence that judicial behavior can in part be explained by 
political party (e.g., Hall and Brace, 1997), none of the prior studies of California’s 
pro tempore justices considered whether temporary justices are more likely to support 
a chief of the same political party.  The data (see Table 4) strongly suggest that this 
was an unfortunate omission, because party seems clearly associated with support for 
the chief. Overall, justices of the same political party as the chief justice supported 
the chief 83.6 percent of the time, whereas justices of the opposite party supported 
the chief only 68.7 percent of the time, a statistically significant difference of almost 
15 percentage points. This effect is not limited to the Bird court. In fact, Chief 
Justice Lucas’s advantage of greater support among his fellow Republicans than 
among Democratic judges (21.4 percent) was even larger than Bird’s advantage 
among her Democratic appointees as compared to Republican justices’ votes (18.2 
percent). By contrast, the partisan advantage for Chief Justice George was smaller. 
These findings suggest that who gets appointed actually can matter.  With discre­
tionary selection, a strategic chief justice could usefully employ political party as a 
rough surrogate for a potential appointee’s ideology and, by extension, perhaps the 
appointee’s vote.  With alphabetical selection, the chief can merely hope for the best.  
Barnett and Rubinfeld correctly noted that aggregate support scores are a fairly 
blunt measure of assignment manipulation by the chief justice. In most cases, the 
chief would have little incentive to engage in assignment manipulation, either 
because the case is less important or because the outcome is expected to be one-sided. 
To account for this, “close” cases—those cases in which the court ultimately split 
4-3—were analyzed separately (see Table 5).  In this analysis, Chief Justices George 
and Lucas are combined because of the small number of cases for each. The results 
are again consistent with the conclusion of assignment manipulation by Chief Justice 
Bird. To a statistically significant degree, Chief Justice Bird’s appointees were more 
prone to vote with her in close cases than were associate justices, although the effect 
is much more pronounced before April 1981 than thereafter.  
24 
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Table 5
 
Support for the Chief Justice in 4-3 Cases
 
Temp. Justices Associate Justices Advantage 
Bird (all) 59.5% (22 of 39) 38.3% (61 of 159) +21.2%* 
Bird (pre-4/81) 100.0% (5 of 5) 37.1% (13 of 35) +62.9%** 
Bird (4/81 & later) 50.0% (17 of 34) 38.7% (48 of 124) +11.3% 
Lucas/George 55.5% (10 of 18) 46.4% (39 of 84) +9.1% 
** p < .01 
* p < .05 
These bivariate relationships were tested using a multivariate model, which 
included as independent variables the type of case (criminal or noncriminal); politi­
cal party (whether the temporary justice and chief justice belonged to the same 
party); experience (whether the temporary justice was a trial or appellate court 
judge); and a variable for the Bird court era. The dependent variable indicated 
whether or not the temporary justice voted with the chief justice. The Bird court 
variable was not statistically significant, undermining the finding that temporary jus­
tices were more likely to support her than her successors The only variable that 
reached statistical significance was the political-party variable.2 
As already noted, the findings discussed concern only appointees from the lower 
courts. However, for purposes of comparison with earlier studies, data on retired jus­
tices were collected for Chief Justice Lucas. Barnett and Rubinfeld (1986:1124) 
found that retired justices agreed with Chief Justice Bird in twenty-three of forty-two 
cases (55 percent). Retired justices were far more supportive of her successor; they 
supported Chief Justice Lucas in sixty-eight of the seventy-five cases in which they 
participated—over 90 percent—a statistically significant difference. 
CONCLUSION 
Previous studies of pro tempore justices in California have sought evidence of assign­
ment bias by Chief Justice Rose Bird by comparing her with her predecessors.  The 
present study addressed the same question by focusing on her successors.  As to Bird, 
it comes to many of the same conclusions as did Barnett and Rubinfeld (1986).  First, 
temporary justices tend to vote with all chief justices at fairly high rates.  Second, the 
evidence of assignment manipulation by Bird is fairly compelling.  It does appear as 
though Bird’s method of assigning the judges before April 1981 had the effect of 
increasing support for her positions.  After April 1981, this effect substantially 
decreased, but it did not disappear until Bird left office.  Most important, the effect 
was especially pronounced in close cases. Finally, the data revealed the unsurprising 
The model was tested utilizing logistic regression, and results are available upon request from the author.  2 
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but heretofore unconfirmed hypothesis that party matters: temporary justices are 
more likely to support a chief justice of their own political party. 
Three main issues arise in the debate over the selection of temporary judges. 
Should they be used? If so, who should select them? And how should they be select­
ed? The findings of this study give us little guidance in answering the first question. 
The need for temporary justices would appear to be partially a function of the size of 
the state’s high court.  As noted by the U.S. Supreme Court, many empirical studies 
suggest that “smaller juries are less likely to foster effective group deliberation” 
(Ballew v. Georgia, at 232) and that this problem becomes more significant as jury size 
approaches six. When, as in the California Supreme Court, there are only seven jus­
tices, the absence of one or more justices may thus be potentially more damaging to 
the quality of deliberations than it would be on a larger court.  Second, California jus­
tices do not enjoy lifetime tenure, perhaps resulting in higher turnover than in the 
federal courts and, therefore, more frequent vacancies.  Between 1994 and 2005, two 
justices departed the U.S. Supreme Court, while five justices departed from the 
California Supreme Court. As long as the California judiciary retains these features, 
pro tempore justices will remain necessary. 
The use of temporary justices may also be desirable in certain situations, especial­
ly when a court would be otherwise deadlocked. The U.S. Supreme Court not infre­
quently confronts cases with only eight justices participating. Sometimes, the Court 
will hold the case over for a year while waiting for a new justice to arrive, resulting in 
delayed justice for the litigants and continued legal uncertainty for the nation. 
Sometimes, the Court deadlocks, deciding the case but not establishing precedent, an 
inefficient use of the Court’s limited resources.  Neither of these outcomes is desirable. 
The use of temporary justices permits the California Supreme Court to conduct its 
duties more efficiently and decisively than would otherwise be true. 
If pro tempore justices are to be used, who should select them, and what proce­
dure should be utilized? The second of these questions is far more important than the 
first. The data strongly suggest that the role of discretion should be reduced or elim­
inated. Rose Bird utilized a discretionary procedure, and she received an advantage 
in support from the appointees she selected in this fashion, with that advantage 
negated once an alphabetical system was adopted. Under an automated system, the 
process of “appointment” becomes nothing more than an administrative chore that 
could be handled with ease by a clerk or an aide to the chief justice. 
No matter what procedure is utilized, of course, politics may play a role in the 
court’s decision.  These findings suggest, for example, that a Republican judge 
assigned through a random procedure may vote differently than would a Democrat 
selected through the same procedure. Similarly, one might reasonably expect that in 
certain cases the appointees’ race, gender, religion, or similar factors would influence 
their behavior.  This kind of “politics” is inevitable in a world where human beings 
must resolve disputes. We cannot eliminate such behavior, but in many contexts, we 
can attempt to compensate for the individuals’ biases by utilizing a more nearly neu­
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tral selection procedure. The decision to institute a system of alphabetical rotation 
in California was correct, but it is also one that could be modified or reversed at any 
time. To avoid the possible return of discretion, and thus to help reinforce public 
confidence in the independence of the judiciary, some form of nondiscretionary 
assignment should be enshrined in the California constitution. jsj 
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